Native American First Amendment Sacred Lands Defense: An Exercise in Judicial Abandonment by Gillingham, John
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 54 
Issue 3 Summer 1989 Article 10 
Summer 1989 
Native American First Amendment Sacred Lands Defense: An 
Exercise in Judicial Abandonment 
John Gillingham 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John Gillingham, Native American First Amendment Sacred Lands Defense: An Exercise in Judicial 
Abandonment, 54 MO. L. REV. (1989) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss3/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 




DEFENSE: AN EXERCISE IN
JUDICIAL ABANDONMENT
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n'
INTRODUCTION
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, the Court
upheld the government's right to build a road and harvest timber on land
considered sacred by three American Indian tribes. 2 The Court's action in
Lyng appears to effectively preclude the possibility of future suits against
the government by American Indian3 plaintiffs attempting to enjoin de-
struction of sacred lands. 4 Unfortunately, the utility of the road and the
value of the timber were negligible when compared to the potentially
devastating effect upon the religion and culture of the tribes.5 Despite the
obvious disparity between the competing irterests, the court stated that
even if "the G-O road will 'virtually destroy the Indians' ability to practice
their religion,' the Constitution simply does not provide a principle that
could justify upholding respondents' [Indians'] legal claims." '6
Native Americans have appealed to the legislature7 and the judicial
system' in efforts to protect their religious tradition and cultural heritage.
1. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
2. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319,
1330 (1988) (Native Americans affected by this litigation are from the Yurok, Karok
and Tolowa tribes).
3. American Indian, Native American and Indian are employed synony-
mously throughout this Note.
4. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319
(1988).
5. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.
586, 594-95 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 764 F.2d 581 (9th
Cir. 1985), aff'd in relevant part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
6. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326-1327 (citation omitted).
7. See infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
8. See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977);
Cole v. Flick, 758 F.2d 124 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 921 (1985); Tetrud
1
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The sacred land cases9 are of paramount importance to American Indian
religious practices as the sites in question are not merely traditional gathering
points; the land represents a physical embodiment of the Indian religion.' 0
Destruction or alteration of the sacred land destroys a vital aspect of the
religion and the cultural underpinnings of Indian society."
Sacred land cases call into question the scope of traditional first amend-
ment free exercise analysis. This note will focus upon the development of
this analysis within and outside of the sacred lands context and the "co-
ercion/penalty limitation" which was firmly embedded in the analysis as
a result of the Lyng decision.
DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF FREE EXERCISE CLAusE ANALYSIS
The Free Exercise Clause
"Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion] .... "12
"[T]he purpose [of the religion clause] was to state an objective, not
to write a statute."' 3 The objective was one of unqualified government
v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975); New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d
693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973); Sample v. Borg, 675 F. Supp.
574 (E.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987);
Indian Inmates v. Gunter, 660 F. Supp. 394 (D. Neb. 1987), aff'd, 857 F.2d 463
(1988); Pollock v. Marshall, 656 F. Supp. 957 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd, 845 F.2d
656, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 239 (1988); United States v. Thirty-Eight (38) Golden
Eagles or Eagle Parts, 649 F. Supp. 269 (D. Nev. 1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 41 (9th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986); Oneida
Indian Nation v. Clark, 593 F. Supp. 257 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Peyote Way Church
of God, Inc. v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Tex. 1983); People v. Woody, 61
Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
9. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1056 (1984); United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247 (D.S.D. 1985), rev'd, 858
F.2d 404 (1988); Inupiat Community v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska
1982), aff'd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 820 (1985); Crow
v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd per curiam, 706 F.2d 856 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480
F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), aff'd,
638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
10. See A. HULTKRANTZ, BELIEF AND WORSIP IN NATrIvE NORTH AmERICA
(C. Vescey ed. 1981); A. HULTKRANTZ, THE RELIGIONS OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS
(M. Setterwall trans. 1979)
11. See Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160 (injuries involved "destruction of 'sacred
sites, medicine gathering sites, holy places and cemeteries ... [and also encompassed]
irreversible loss to the culture and history of the plaintiffs."'). See also Stambor,
Manifest Destiny and American Indian Religious Freedom: Sequoyah, Badoni and
the Drowned Gods, 10 Am. INDINr L. REv. 59, 59-60 (1982); Note, Native Americans
and the Free Exercise Clause, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1509, 1510 (1977).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 2
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neutrality concerning the religious practices and beliefs of all citizens.' 4
This principle has been inherently easier to profess than to apply given
the myriad of conflicting religious interests in our society. The Supreme
Court has attempted to formulate an analytical framework capable of
protecting the government's ability to independently and efficiently conduct
its affairs, while at the same time insuring each individual's right to free
expression of religious beliefs.
Originally construed to cover only the right to hold one's chosen
religious beliefs, 5 the free exercise clause now protects an individual's right
to act in conformity with those beliefs.'" Therefore, when implementation
of government policy serves to constrain one's ability to express a particular
form of worship, that individual may invoke constitutional protections.
Religious beliefs that do not conform to the traditional praxis of
mainstream religions are afforded the same protection as more established
faiths.' 7 The Supreme Court has clearly stated that "religious beliefs need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order
to merit first amendment protection."' 8 This proclamation theoretically
guarantees that the narrowly tailored piety of "accepted" religions will not
be used to characterize non-mainstream religions as philosophy and, there-
fore, outside the ambit of the Constitution. 19
Finally, it is important to note three premises that apply to the following
discussion. First, constitutional protection is not denied because the burden
14. Thomas Jefferson's view of the first amendment as "a wall of separation
between Church and State" reflects this notion of the government's detachment
from the affairs of religion. 16 THE WarrnNGs OF THomAS JEFFERSON 282 (A.
Libscomb ed. 1904).
15. The Supreme Court illustrated this restrictive stance in a Mormon po-
lygamy case where it stated:
Plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to
the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
16. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). Protection of the
right to act, though recognized, is not absolute. The Supreme Court explained:
[T]he Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom
to act. The first is absolute but, ... the second cannot be. Conduct
remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.... In every
case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, on attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.
Id.
17. Despite this proclamation, lower federal courts have encountered difficulty
understanding the central role that sacred lands play in Native American religious
practice. See infra notes 69-99 and accompanying text.
18. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
19. Thomas, 405 U.S. at 713-15 (confirmed that first amendment protection
attaches to religious, not philosophical beliefs).
1989]
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placed upon the plaintiff is "the denial of or placing of conditions upon
a benefit or privilege." 20 Second, the free exercise of religion is safeguarded
when the alleged infringement occurs on or involves public property. 21
Third, the free exercise clause is applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment.Y
Free Exercise Clause Analysis
The free exercise analysis was articulated and subsequently refined in
Sherbert v. Verner2 and its progeny.24 Under this analysis the initial ob-
ligation fails upon the plaintiff to establish that an action or policy of the
government has burdened"  a sincerely held26 religious belief.27 Once this
prima facie case is established,2 the burden shifts to the government to
show that the infringement is justified by a "compelling state interest"
that cannot be implemented by any less restrictive means. 29
20. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). Sherbert provided an
extensive list of cases addressing invalidated conditions. Id. at 407 n.7.
21. A federal district court in South Dakota stated:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public
places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.
United States v. Means, 627 F. Supp. 247, 257 (D.S.D. 1985), rev'd, 858 F.2d
404 (1988) (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
22. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
23. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963).
24. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Indiana Employment See. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
26. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (the judiciary lacks the
capacity to discern the truth of a religious belief but can entertain whether the
belief was sincerely held).
27. Given the Court's professed inability to adequately judge the truth of
a religious belief, it follows that the courts are wary of classifying an alleged
religious belief as philosophy and, therefore, unprotected by the first amendment.
The Court has been very liberal in accepting a particular belief as religiously based.
See infra text accompanying notes 121-28 discussing the beliefs of Stephen Roy in
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (specified
that the beliefs must be "rooted in religion").
28. See infra notes 35-99 and accompanying text for additional detail on
the requirements for establishing a prima facie case based on the free exercise
clause. See also L. TamE, ArwaicAN CONsrTruIoNAL LAw § 14-12 (2d ed. 1988).
29. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963)). Compelling state interest is the terminology predominantly used. "Com-
pelling" is understood to mean "only those interests of the highest order." Yoder, 4
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Without additional constraints, this framework would produce a pleth-
ora of lawsuits from diverse religious groups claiming government in-
fringement of their respective religious beliefs. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has narrowed the category of government behavior that is actionable
under the first amendment.30 The Lyng Court, in a five-to-three decision, 3'
confirmed that only government action which either coerces, directly or
indirectly, 32 or penalizes33 the exercise of religion will be afforded first
amendment protection. The Indians' inability to meet this threshold criterion
precluded further inquiry into the merits of their case. The harsh results
in Lyng and the potential for objectionable outcomes in other contexts
suggest the need for closer scrutiny of the coercion/penalty34 component
of the free exercise analysis.
The Coercion/Penalty Limitation
In most instances, the coercion/penalty limitation is functionally em-
ployed to confine first amendment protection to those cases in which the
"government interacts, or refuses to interact, with believers. ' 3 5 Coercion
occurs when the government interacts with individuals by compelling be-
havior repugnant to religious beliefs36 or by outlawing certain religious
406 U.S. at 215. If the government establishes a compelling interest, it has an
obligation to prove that it serves the interest in such a way as to minimize the
adverse impact on persons presenting valid free exercise claims. If the government
can accommodate the interest in a less intrusive manner, then the constitution
requires that the government do so. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407-408 (citations
omitted) (although a state has a compelling interest "[it] would plainly be incumbent
upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would
[satisfy the interest] without infringing First Amendment rights.").
30. See infra text accompanying notes 35-68 regarding the coercion/penalty
limitation.
31. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1321 (Justice Kennedy did not participate in the
decision. Justice Brennan filed a scathing dissent in which Justices Marshall and
Blackmun joined).
32. Id. at 1326. Previous Supreme Court free exercise cases have used similar
terminology. The Court coined the "indirect" language and solidified the application
of first amendment protection to this area of government action in Sherbert.
33. Id. Justice O'Connor used "penalty" to denote those forms of govern-
ment action that would place "the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of
religion as would a fine imposed." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
34. The coercion/penalty language used in Lyng is somewhat redundant
assuming that both indirect and direct coercion are implicit in the coercion label.
Drawing a distinction between penalization and indirect coercion is artificial as
both represent identical forms of government action or inaction that may trigger
a free exercise claim. Nevertheless, use of these terms in Lyng indicates they are
the current terms of art for describing potentially actionable government behavior.
35. L. TRiNE, supra note 28, at 1243.
36. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (established a re-
quirement that Amish adolescents attend school until sixteen years old).
19891
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practices." Religious beliefs are penalized when benefits such as unem-
ployment or welfare benefits are withheld because practitioners refuse to
engage in acts proscribed by their religion, and completion of these acts
is a prerequisite to qualification for the benefits.
A. Coercion
Wisconsin v. Yoder illustrates government conduct compelling practi-
tioners to act contrary to their religious convictions. 8 In Yoder, Amish
parents were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school atten-
dance statute 9 when they refused to allow their children to attend public
school beyond the eighth grade. 40 Expert witnesses testified that participation
in secondary education would subject impressionable Amish adolescents to
a world view anathema to Amish beliefs. 41 Therefore, the Amish were
37. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upheld a law
prohibiting bigamy even though it conflicted with Mormon religious practices).
38. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
39. Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1969). Pertinent sections provide:
(1) (a) Unless the child has a legal excuse or has graduated from high
school, any person having under his control a child who is between the
ages of 7 and 16 years shall cause such child to attend school regularly
during the full period and hours, religious holidays excepted, that the
public or private school in which such child should be enrolled is in session
until the end of the school term in which he becomes 16 years of age.
(3) This section does not apply to any child who is not in proper physical
or mental condition to attend school, to any child exempted for good
cause by the school board of the district in which the child resides ...
(5) Whoever violates this section ... may be fined not less than $5 nor
more than $50 or imprisoned not more than 3 months or both.
Id. (emphasis added).
40. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
41. Id. at 209-12. Relevant testimony was:
Old Order Amish communities today are characterized by a fundamental
belief that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart
from the world and worldly influence .... The high school tends to
emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, com-
petitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students. Amish
society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of "goodness,"
rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge;
community welfare rather than competition; and separation from, rather
than integration with, contemporary worldly society.
[.. High school] takes them away from their community, physically
and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of
life [when they] must acquire Amish attitudes favoring manual work and
self-reliance . . ..
[Vol. 54
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forced to either imperil the spiritual development of their youth, and
arguably threaten the continued viability of their religion, or suffer pros-
ecution by the state. 42 The Court noted that "[t]he impact of the compulsory-
attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish religion was not
only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compelled
them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts at odds with
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs." 43
By enacting a statute that required Amish adolescents to participate
in an environment hostile to their beliefs, the State of Wisconsin aided
the Amish in meeting the threshold criterion. This affirmative state action
represented government behavior sufficient to meet the coercion require-
ment. Having satisfied the coercion requirement, the Amish were permitted
to establish that a sincere" religious belief was burdened45 by the statute.
Consequently, Wisconsin had to establish that compulsory school attendance
was a compelling state interest. 46 The Court recognized that effective ed-
ucation of citizens is a profoundly important state interest. 47 The majority
reasoned, however, that granting an exception to the Amish would not
significantly threaten that goal because the Amish "system of learning-by-
doing was an 'ideal system' of education in terms of preparing Amish
children for life as adults in the Amish community ... .1-4 The Amish
were able to show that a state statute coerced behavior damaging to their
religious tenets, and the Court carved out an exception to the statute
whereby Amish youth in Wisconsin were no longer required to attend public
school beyond the eighth grade.4 9
Enforcement of a statute, regulation, or ordinance which proscribes
behavior considered necessary for the meaningful practice of a religion
imposes a coercive restraint upon the free exercise of that religion. In
Reynolds v. United States50 however, the Mormon practice of polygamy
was outlawed even though marriage to a second wife, in certain circum-
stances, was an established tenet of the Mormon church. Reynolds affirmed
that the government may prohibit activity considered contrary to the interests
of society even if the behavior is central to and sanctioned by a particular
religious body:
[P]lural marriages should not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices
to the contrary because of his religious beliefs? To permit this would be
to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of
42. Id. at 218.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 235.
45. Id. at 215-20, 235.
46. See supra note 29.
47. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
48. Id. at 223.
49. Id. at 234.
50. 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). 7
Gillingham: Gillingham: Native American First Amendment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself."
The government's ability to proscribe practices otherwise legitimate through
religious traditions provides another example of a genre of cases falling
under the coercion rubric.
B. Penalty
Supreme Court cases recognizing first amendment protection where
religious beliefs are penalized by government policy are grounded in the
precedents set in Sherbert v. Verner.12 Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist,
was refused unemployment compensation provided for by state act53 when
she refused to work on Saturdays. 4 Seventh-day Adventists believe that
the Bible designates Saturday as the Sabbath and this day, therefore, is
to be set aside as a time for rest and worship. Saturday labor was not
required when Sherbert applied for her position but administrative changes
two years later mandated work on Saturday for all shifts." Sherbert con-
scientiously pursued employment both in and outside of her chosen field
51. Id. at 166-67.
52. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
53. Id. at 400. The South Carolina statute, S.C. CODE §§ 68-113 to 68-114
(1962), provided in relevant part:
68-113 ... An unemployed insured worker shall be eligible to receive
benefits with respect to any week only if the Commission finds that:
(3) He is able to work and is available for work ....
68-114 ... Any insured shall be ineligible for benefits:
(2"). . . If the Commission finds that he has been discharged for
misconduct connected with his most recent work prior to filing ....
(3) .'. . (a) If the Commission finds that he has failed, without good
cause, (i) either to apply for available suitable work, when so directed by
the employment office or the Commission, (ii) to accept available suitable
work when offered him by the employment office or the employer ...
[then] ineligibility shall continue for a period of five weeks ... as de-
termined by the Commission according to the circumstances in each case
(b) In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual,
the Commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health,
safety and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his experience
and prior earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing
local work in his customary occupation and the distance of the available
work from his residence.
54. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
55. Id. at 399 n.l. Persons holding this belief are called Sabbatarians. A
minority of Christian sects and the Jewish faith observe Saturday as the Sabbath.
[Vol. 54
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but efforts to secure a position that did not conflict with her Sabbath
were unavailing.16 The court indicated:
[Sherbert was required to] choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of
the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant
for her Saturday worship.-,
Given Sherbert's dilemma, the Court recognized that "condition[ing]
the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a
principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her
constitutional liberties." 58 The condition placed upon Sherbert penalized
her for devotion to her beliefs. Thus, the Court proceeded with the standard
free exercise analysis. The Court found that Sherbert's convictions were
sincere and religiously based59 and concluded that no compelling state interest
justified denial of the unemployment benefits. 60
Similar results were obtained in Thomas v. Review Board6l Thomas,
a Jehovah's Witness, was refused unemployment compensation because he
voluntarily terminated his employment upon transfer to a division fabricating
military hardware. Thomas claimed that his beliefs forbade participation
in the construction of weaponry. 62 Relying heavily upon Sherbert, the Court
confirmed:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because
of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden
upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement
upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial. 63
Conditioning benefits upon Thomas' willingness to violate the tenets
of his belief system is analogous to the penalty imposed upon Sherbert.
The penalty, extant when the government refused to confer benefits upon
Thomas, brought Thomas' claim within the purview of first amendment
protection.
56. Id. at 399 n.2.
57. Id. at 404.
58. Id. at 406 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)) (emphasis
added). But see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Jewish plaintiff argued
that Sunday closing laws imposed an economic hardship on persons observing a
Saturday Sabbath. Despite the penalty imposed, the Court found that the need to
designate a uniform day of rest outweighed this objection).
59. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
60. Id. at 406-09.
61. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 717-18.
1989]
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In 1987 the Court addressed a Sabbatarian's right to collect unem-
ployment benefits when religious conversion subsequent to employment
conflicted with existing obligati6ns to work Saturdays.' The Court con-
cluded that the "timing of Hobbie's conversion [was] immaterial .... In
Sherbert, Thomas, and the present case, the employee was forced to choose
between fidelity to religious belief and continued employment .... "65 Hob-
bie, confirming the precedent set in Sherbert and Thomas," stated that to
determine whether a penalty is present the existence of a choice between
work versus remaining faithful to one's beliefs rather than the time the
choice became operative, is the dispositive factor. 67 This dilemma satisfied
the threshold criteria necessary for the Court to proceed with the free
exercise analysis. 68
APPLICATION OF FRiEE EXERCISE ANALYSiS TO NATIVE AmERCAN CLAIMS
Courts have struggled to discern and consistently apply an appropriate
free exercise analysis when dealing with infringements upon Native Amer-
ican religious practice.6 9 There is little doubt that a significant factor
contributing to this legal disarray is the judiciary's inability to relate to
an unfamiliar cultural/religious framework. 0 Cultural myopia causes courts
64. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (em-
phasis added).
65. Id. at 144.
66. Id. at 139-40.
67. Id. at 143-44.
68. Justice O'Connor asserted, "It is true that this Court has repeatedly
held that indirect coercion or penalties of the free exercise of religion, not just
outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment." Lyng,
108 S. Ct. at 1326.
69. Compare State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975) (sacramental
.peyote use by Native Americans violates narcotics laws despite free exercise assertion)
with People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d. 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964)
(peyote use protected under first amendment). Compare Cole v. Flick, 758 F.2d
124 (3rd Cir. 1985) (American Indian held in custody was required to cut his hair
to comply with prison regulations despite his religious beliefs) with Teterud v.
Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (Indian inmate could wear long braids contrary
to prison regulations, based on a first amendment challenge). The district court in
Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), rejected a sacred land
claim because the Indians lacked a property interest. Subsequent decisions have
invalidated this stance.
70. See Note, Religion: The First Amendment and the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 10 AmR. INDIAN L. REv. 151, 153 (1983); Note,
The First Amendment and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act: An Ap-
proach to Protecting Native American Religion, 71 IowA L. Rv. 869, 869 (1986);
Note, American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and Government Development: A
Conventional Analysis in an Unconventional Setting, 85 MICH. L. REv. 771, 789-
99 (1987); Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of
Public Lands, YALE L.J. 1447, 1464 (1985).
[Vol. 54
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to characterize legitimate Indian claims as "non-religious"', or as in-
fringements that are not "central ' 72 to the practice of their religion.
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,3 Cherokee Indians at-
tempted to enjoin the completion of a dam on the Little Tennessee River
which would flood the "sacred homeland" of the tribe.74 The engulfing
waters would destroy "sacred sites, medicine gathering sites, holy places and
cemeteries [and would] disturb the sacred balance of the land .... -7" The
court found that the Indians' claims "demonstrate 'personal preference'
rather than convictions 'shared by an organized group.' ' 76 Further, the
court found that flooding sacred lands would "damage ... tribal and
family folklore and traditions, more than particular religious observ-
ances .... -77 These findings prevailed despite the court's recognition of
the validity of the religion and the sincerity of the Indians' belief.78
Sequoyah's free exercise test allows a first amendment challenge if the
Indians succeed in establishing that the sacred land in jeopardy is "central"
or "indispensable" to the exercise of the religion. 79 If the plaintiffs meet
this threshold requirement, the next step is to "balance the opposing interests
of the parties or to determine whether the government's interest in pro-
ceeding ... is compelling."' 80 It remains unclear whether the court of
appeals was advocating a standard balancing test or requiring the govern-
ment to come forward with a compelling interest. This latter segment of
the test was never employed in Sequoyah because the court determined
that the plaintiffs did not pass the central/indispensable criteria.
Badoni v. Higginson, also decided in 1980, presented another Native
American sacred land free exercise challenge." Navajo Indians in Utah
attempted to persuade the government to maintain the Glen Canyon Dam
reservoir at a lower level to prevent flooding of portions of their sacred
71. Addressing the nature of sacred Indian land in Tennessee, the Sixth
Circuit stated, "These affidavits appear to demonstrate 'personal preference' rather
than convictions 'shared by an organized group.' . . . It is damage to tribal and
family folklore and traditions, more than particular religious observances, which
appears to be at stake." Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164
(6th Cir. 1980).
72. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Sequoyah v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Means,
627 F. Supp. 247 (D.S.D. 1985), rev'd, 858 F.2d 404 (1988); Crow v. Gullet, 541
F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982).
73. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
74. Id. at 1160.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1164.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1163.
79. Id. at 1164.
80. Id. at 1165 (emphasis added).
81. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
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land.12 The waters of Lake Powell covered certain sites considered to be
incarnations of Navajo gods.83 The Navajos contended that the existence
of the reservoir effectively negated the efficacy of ceremonies performed
for the health and protection of the tribe. 4
The appellate court presented a "two-step process" in Badoni, for
analyzing free exercise claims, stating that it must "first determine whether
government action create[d] a burden.""5 The court proceeded to outline
the nature of a burden as requiring the "coercive effect of [an] enactment
as it operates against ... the practice of religion. ' 86 Additionally, the
Badoni court required the plaintiff to establish that the belief was of a
truly religious origin and sincerely held. 87 The second prong of the analysis
required a compelling state interest. 88
Instead of proceeding through the analysis as proposed, the court
directed its attention to the second prong of the analysis and found a
compelling state interest. 89 This finding allowed the court to circumvent
"the question whether the government action involved infringe[d] plaintiffs'
free exercise of religion." 9 The test as enumerated provides some insight
into the analysis the court considered appropriate, even though it was not
sequentially applied.
In Wilson v. Block,91 a federal appellate court employed the Sequoyah
centrality/indispensability burden requirement and found no cognizable free
exercise burden. Wilson involved the expansion of an existing ski resort
in the San Francisco Peaks of Arizona, 92 which was land considered sacred
by Navajo and Hopi tribes.93 The Navajo believe that the Peaks are a
living "spiritual being or god, with various peaks forming the head, shoul-
ders, and knees ... while the trees, plants, rocks, and earth form the
82. The Navajos considered four religious sites to be sacred: a sacred spring,
cave, prayer site and a huge sandstone arch known as the Rainbow Bridge. The
spring, cave and prayer site were completely submerged below the reservoir waters.
Rainbow Bridge, measuring 309 feet high with a 178 feet span, is projected to
lose approximately 46 feet of its base to the waters of Lake Powell. Id. at 175-
77.
83. Id. at 177 (since the Navajo consider these sites to be incarnate deities,
they believe the reservoir waters drowned their gods.
84. Id. at 177.
85. Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 176-77.
89. Id. at 177.
90. Id. at 177 n.4.
91. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
92. Id. at 739. The expansion entailed clearing of fifty acres for new ski
runs, construction of a new day lodge, improvement of restroom facilities, recon-
struction of existing chair lifts, construction of three new lifts and paving and
widening of the Snow Bowl road. Id.
93. Id. at 178.
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skin." 94 They believe that many deities reside in the Peaks, and the sacred
mountains are viewed as one boundary of the Navajo homeland. Both
tribes maintain shrines in the Peaks, and members collect herbs and hunt
for wildlife in these mountains for use in ceremonies at the shrines. 95
After finding that the tribe's beliefs were sincerely held and religiously
based, the Wilson court, nevertheless, confirmed Sequoyah's central or
indispensable burden test by asserting, "If the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate
that the government land at issue is indispensable to some religious practice,
whether or not central to their religion, they have not justified a First
Amendment claim." 96 The court in Wilson added a new dimension to the
indispensability criterion by requiring that "plaintiffs seeking to restrict
government land use in the name of religious freedom must, at a minimum,
demonstrate that the government's proposed land use would impair a
religious practice that could not be performed at any other site."' 97 The
court concluded that the area encompassing the fully developed facility,
including the additional roads, ski lifts, and lodge, was minimal when
compared to the total area of the Peaks, and therefore alternate sites could
be utilized for conducting ceremonies and gathering items used in the rites.98
The Indians inability to establish a recognized burden on their religious
practices defeated their claim. 99
In the Indian sacred land cases, the federal courts effectively precluded
attempts by Native Americans to preserve their sacred lands from destruction
or alteration via government action. A compilation of all the components
of the free exercise tests employed in sacred land cases, as propounded
by the courts reads as follows:
1. Plaintiffs must establish that their beliefs are sincere.
2. Plaintiffs must show that the beliefs are religiously based.
3. Plaintiffs must show that the land in question is central and indispensable
to the practice of their religion to the extent that the practice is incapable
of being conducted elsewhere.
4. Plaintiffs must show that the government action significantly burdens
their ability to practice their religion.
Once plaintiffs construct this prima facie case, the government
is required to either:
1. Come forward with a compelling state interest that may not be protected
in any less restrictive manner, or
2. Weigh the relative strengths of the interests asserted.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 743.
97. Id. at 744 (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 745.
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This was the analysis for sacred land cases when Lyng came before the
district court in California.
Facts and Lower Court Treatment of Lyng
The Yurok, Karok and Tolowa Indian tribes have conducted religious
ceremonies since the early nineteenth century in an area known as the high
country in northwestern California.'00 This land, located within the Blue
Creek Unit 10 ' of Six Rivers National Forest, is sacred to the tribes and
integral to their religious worship.'02
In 1981 and 1982 the Forest Service issued environmental impact state-
ments indicating its intent to harvest timber and build a road through the
high country. 03 In compliance with the American Indian Religious Freedom
Act (AIRFA),' °0 the government consulted Indian religious leaders. Further,
100. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson (Northwest I),
565 F. Supp. 586, 591 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 764
F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd in relevant part, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986),
rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct.
1319 (1988).
101. Id. at 591. The Blue Creek Unit encompasses 67,500 acres, of which
31,000 are designated as a roadless area. A roadless area is "[a]n area of undeveloped
Federal land within which there are not improved roads maintained for travel by
means of motorized vehicles intended for highway use." Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n v. Peterson (Northwest II), 764 F.2d 581, 583 n.l (9th Cir. 1985)
(quoting FoREst SERVIcE MMAuAL § 8260(B)(3)(a)(1)).
102. Northwest 1, 565 F. Supp. at 591-92. The sacred use and nature of the
land was illuminated by explaining:
Individuals hike into the high country and use "prayer seats" located at
Doctor Rock, Chimney Rock, and Peak 8 to seek religious guidance or
personal "power" through "engaging in emotional [and] spiritual exchange
with the creator." Such exchange is made possible by the solitude, quietness,
and pristine environment found in the high country. Certain key participants
in tribal religious ceremonies such as the White Deerskin and Jump Dances
(these dances provide the periodic "World Renewal" that is essential to
the Indians' religious belief system) must visit the high country prior to
the ceremony to purify themselves and to make "preparatory medicine."
The religious power these individuals acquire in the high country lends
meaning to these tribal ceremonies, thereby enhancing the spiritual welfare
of the entire tribal community. Medicine women in the tribes travel to
the high country to pray, to obtain spiritual power, and to gather medicines.
They then return to the tribe to administer to the sick the healing power
gained in the high country through the Brush and Kick Dances.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote included parenthetically).
103. Northwest II, 764 F.2d at 584.
104. American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(1982). The Act provides:
On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United States
to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom
to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American
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the government commissioned a full study'05 to determine the impact of
the proposed development upon "cultural and religious sites in the area." "3d
After considering all proposed routes, 1°7 the study concluded that the
proposed road "would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred
areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and
lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples."'0 8 The report strongly
recommended against completion of the road. 1 9 The Forest Service dis-
regarded the study's recommendation and decided to proceed with the
road construction and logging operations. Following this, four American
Indians, the State of California and various organizations filed suit to
enjoin these activities."10
The district and appellate court held that the Government violated the
Indians' first amendment rights."' Both courts found the Indians' belief
that the high country was sacred to be sincerely held and religiously based.12
The centrality/ indispensability requirement was met; "For the Yurok,
Karok, and Tolowa peoples, the high country constitutes the center of the
spiritual world. No other geographic areas or sites hold equivalent religious
significance for these tribes.""' The final requirement of establishing a
burden on the Indians' religious practice was found in the Forest Service's
study that concluded "[i]ntrusions on the sanctity of the Blue Creek high
Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited
to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom
to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
Id. See also infra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
105. D. THEODORATUS, CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK SECTION,
GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RvERs NATIONAL FoREST (1979).
106. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1322.
107. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson (Northwest III),
795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 1986). The Forest Service presented nine routes for
consideration. Id. The Court explained that "alternate routes that would have
avoided the Chimney Rock area altogether were rejected because they would have
required the acquisition of private land, had serious soil stability problems, and
would in any event have traversed areas having ritualistic value to American
Indians." Lyng, 108 S. Ct at 1322.
108. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1322 (quoting D. T-mODORATuS, supra note 105,
at 182). The Chimney Rock section of the road would function to connect two
longer segments of pavement. Upon completion, this 6.02 mile segment of the road
would connect the towns of Gasquet and Orleans in northwest California. Northwest
III, 795 F.2d at 690.
109. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1322.
110. Northwest r, 565 F. Supp. at 590-91. Organizations and other individuals
involved in the suit included: The Sierra Club, The Wilderness Club, California
Trout, Siskiyou Mountains Resource Council, Redwood Region Audubon Society,
Northcoast Environmental Center, and Timothy McKay and John Amadio, two
Sierra Club members. Id. at 590.
111. Northwest II, 764 F.2d at 589.
112. Id. at 586.
113. Northwest I, 565 F. Supp. at 594.
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country are... potentially destructive of the very core of Northwest [Indian]
religious beliefs and practices." 11 4 The Indians had met every criterion
promulgated by previous courts addressing the sacred land issue.
Accordingly, the next step of the analysis focused upon whether the
government's interests in the logging and road construction were compelling
and were instituted in the least restrictive manner."' The district court
found that the interests claimed by the Forest Service were not "of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the free exercise
clause. 11 6 The courts found that the existing sections of road provided
adequate access to the area for Forest Service purposes and that the amount
of lumber to be harvested from the high country was "a small fraction
of the timber resources to be found in the entire Six Rivers National
Forest.11 7 Both courts issued permanent injunctions precluding road con-
struction and logging in the high country." 8 These decisions represented
the first successful sacred land defenses by Indian plaintiffs.
Supreme Court Disposition and Rationale
The Court in Lyng conceded that "too much disturbance of the [high
country's] natural state would clearly render any meaningful continuation
of traditional [religious] practices impossible."" 9 Yet, even if the govern-
ment's action "will 'virtually destroy the Indian's capacity to practice their
religion,"' the Constitution affords no protection for this incidental effect.2 0
The majority justified this result by narrowly construing the government's
action as neither coercing the Indians to act in a fashion contrary to their
beliefs nor penalizing them by withholding benefits.
In deciding Lyng, the Court principally relied upon the logic employed
in Bowen v. Roy. 21 Roy, a descendent of the Abenaki tribe, "testified he
had recently developed a religious objection to obtaining a social security
number [for his daughter because he] believe[d] that technology [was]
'robbing the spirit of man."' 22 The majority apparently upheld the sincere
religious status of Roy's belief even though the belief purportedly was not
114. Id. at 595.
115. Id. at 595-96.
116. Id. at 592 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)).
117. Id. at 596.
118. Id. at 606.
119. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. 1326.
120. Id. at 1326-27.
121. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
122. Id. at 696.
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held by a significant body of adherents, but rather was the product of
Roy's "recent conversations with an Abenaki chief."''
Welfare recipients, however, must supply a social security number to
the state to qualify for welfare benefits.'z4 The social security number is
required to avoid fraudulent claims.' 21 Roy claimed this requirement pro-
hibited the free exercise of his religion. 26 Success on the first amendment
claim would have allowed Roy to dictate the accounting procedures by
which his family received government relief. 27 The Court responded by
stating:
123. Id. The Supreme Court did not scrutinize the religious foundation of
Roy's belief as comprehensively as it had scrutinized similar beliefs in previous
free exercise challenges. The Court noted in Yoder that:
[I]f the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective eval-
uation and rejection of the contemporary, secular values accepted by the
majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and
isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious
basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious,
and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.
406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
Again in Yoder, the court emphasized that the claim presented was "not merely
a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by
an organized group, and intimately related to daily living." Id. at 216. There is
no evidence that Roy's beliefs were either the reflection of a composite belief
system of an "organized group" or "intimately related" to his daily existence.
The Court has traditionally drawn a distinction between philosophic and religious
beliefs. Admittedly, this distinction has no clear line of demarcation. Given the
Hobbie, Bowen and Lyng holdings, the Court is adopting a more liberal definition
of what constitutes religious belief, especially when contrasted to the decision in
Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority where damage to sacred land was designated
as merely damage to folklore and traditions. 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980).
The difficulty of distinguishing valid religious beliefs from those not "rooted in
religion" has long been acknowledged by the Court. If the decision in Bowen and
the language used in Hobble and Lyng are indicative, then one may assume that
the Court will accept assertions that particular beliefs are religiously based, unless
a contrary showing is clearly made. The Court appears, however, to have solidified
its reluctance to designate a professed religious belief as personal philosophy rather
than to have adopted a change of policy.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25)(A) (1982). The Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program requires that "as a condition of eligibility under the
plan, each applicant for or recipient of aid shall furnish to the State agency his
social security account number . . . ." Id. A similar prerequisite was enacted for
receipt of relief through the Food Stamp program. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(e) (1982). Roy
had applied for and obtained welfare benefits through the AFDC and the Food
Stamp programs. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 695.
125. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 709.
126. Id. at 695.
127. Id. Bowen's language reflected the fact that the plaintiff attempted to
administratively dictate the method by which he could receive government benefits.
Presumably such motivation does not tug at the Court's heartstrings. The Court
stated, "Appellees may not use the Free Exercise Clause to demand government
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The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the
Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with
the religious beliefs of particular citizens.... The Free Exercise Clause
affords protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does
not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's
internal procedures.'2
The majority analogized Lyng to Bowen and determined that "[t]he
building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land
cannot meaningfully be distinguished from the use of a Social Security
number in [Bowen].' ' 29 The Indians' attempts to distinguish the cases were
unavailing even though:
[T]he social security number in [Bowen] could be characterized as interfering
with Roy's religious tenets from a subjective point of view, where the
government's conduct of "its own internal affairs was known to him only
secondhand and did not interfere with his ability to practice his religion."
... In this case, however, it is said that the proposed road will physically
destroy the environmental conditions and the privacy without which the
[religious] practices cannot be conducted.3 0
Despite these dissimilarities, the Court found a sufficient nexus based on
the fact that neither Bowen nor the Yurok, Karok or Tolowa Indians were
coerced or penalized by government action. 3 1 Therefore, the Court's narrow
reading of Lyng served to definitively incorporate the coercion/penalty
limitation into free exercise clause analysis.
LEGISLATIVE AcTION
The Supreme Court stated in Lyng:
The Constitution does not, and the courts cannot, offer to reconcile the
various competing demands on government, many of them rooted in sincere
benefits, but only on their terms, particularly where that insistence works a de-
monstrable disadvantage to the Government in the administration of the programs,"
Id. at 711-12 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 699-700 (emphasis added).
129. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1325. The dissent found the majority's inability to
distinguish these activities and, therefore, the cases "altogether remarkable." Id.
at 1336. It further stated:
In [Bowen], we repeatedly stressed the "internal" nature of the Government
practice at issue: noting that Roy objected to "the widespread use of the
social security number by the federal or state governments in their computer
systems." ... [W]e likened the use of such recordkeeping numbers to
decisions concerning the purchase of office equipment .... Federal land-
use decisions, by contrast are likely to have substantial external effects
that government decisions concerning office furniture and information
storage obviously will not, and they are correspondingly subject to public
scrutiny and public challenge in a host of ways that office equipment
purchases are not.
Id.
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religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as ours. That
task, to the extent that it is feasible, is for the legislatures and otherinstitutions. 13
The Court thus established that (1) the court system is unwilling to
hear free exercise challenges by Indian plaintiffs seeking to protect sacred
land from potentially destructive government action, and (2) the appropriate
relief mechanism, "to the extent that it is feasible," lies with Congress.' 3
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA) addresses
the subject matter of Lyng. AIRFA professes to "protect and preserve for
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express and
exercise the traditional religions of American Indians ... including but
not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and
the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.113 4 Al-
though seemingly on point, the courts have consistently held that the statute
does not create any justiciable rights. 1'1
Yet, on March 31, 1988, Senator Cranston of California introduced
a bill to create such a justiciable right.' 36 Senate Bill 2250, an amendment
to the AIRFA, was introduced with the express purpose of "ensur[ing]
that Federal lands are managed in a manner that does not impair the
exercise of traditional American Indian religion." '137 The initial draft of
the bill stated:
Sec. 3. (a) Except in cases involving compelling governmental interests of
the highest order, Federal lands that have been historically indispensable
to a traditional America [sic] Indian religion shall not be managed in a
manner that would seriously impair or interfere with the exercise or practice
of such traditional American Indian religion.
(b) United States district courts shall have the authority to issue such
orders as may be necessary to enforce the provisions of this section.,38
Section 3 (a) outlined the basic parameters of a framework designed
to handle sacred land conflicts and § 3 (b) provided Indian plaintiffs with
132. Id. at 1327.
133. Id. Courts have traditionally provided an arena in which less powerful
members of society have had the opportunity to be heard on equal footing with
individuals wielding greater influence. Relegating the resolution of Native American
claims to Congress distinctly disadvantages Indians due to Congress' status as the
representative branch of the federal government. Given the small number of Amer-
ican Indians and their relative lack of political power, one might persuasively argue
that Congress is an inadequate forum for the expression of Indian concerns.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978).
135. See, e.g., Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1328. Justice O'Connor stated, "Nowhere
in the law is there so much as a hint of any intent to create a cause of action
or any judicially enforceable individual rights." Id.
136. 134 CONG. REc. S3,633 (daily ed. March 31, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Cranston).
137. Id.
138. S. 2250, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988).
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a vehicle of enforcement. If Congress had passed it, this legislation would
have supplied Native Americans with a vehicle by which they could have
gained access once again to courts to seek protection of their sacred lands.
Proponents will reintroduce Senate Bill 2250 during the 101st Congress.' 39
Passage of such a bill would inevitably rekindle the quest for an appropriate
balancing analysis which would necessarily entail judicial definition of the
statutory language. Courts would have to determine which concerns qualify
as "government interests of the highest order" and what magnitude of
harm would be deemed to "seriously impair or interfere with the exercise
or practice of ... American Indian religion."'' 4
CONCLUSION
In Lyng, the Supreme Court confirmed the inclusion of a coercion/
penalty limitation in first amendment free exercise analysis. Failure to prove
that government action serves to either 1) coerce an individual to act
contrary to their beliefs, or 2) penalize exercise of that person's religion
results in forfeiture of the plaintiff's claim.
Indian plaintiffs are currently devoid of any justiciable right that would
allow them to protect sacred land under government supervision from
potentially destructive action. Passage of a proposed amendment to AIRFA
would provide American Indians with access to the judicial system for
redress of their sacred land grievances.
JOHN GILLINOHAM
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